The arms race: adversarial search defeats entropy used to detect malware by Menéndez, Héctor D. et al.
Expert Systems With Applications 118 (2019) 246–260 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Expert Systems With Applications 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eswa 
The arms race: Adversarial search defeats entropy used to detect 
malware 
Héctor D. Menéndez ∗, Sukriti Bhattacharya , David Clark , Earl T. Barr 
Gower St, London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 16 May 2018 
Revised 23 August 2018 
Accepted 6 October 2018 
Available online 6 October 2018 
Keywords: 
Malware 
Information theory 
Entropy 
Time series 
Packing 
Adversarial learning 
a b s t r a c t 
Malware creators have been getting their way for too long now. String-based similarity measures can 
leverage ground truth in a scalable way and can operate at a level of abstraction that is diﬃcult to com- 
bat from the code level. At the string level, information theory and, speciﬁcally, entropy play an important 
role related to detecting patterns altered by concealment strategies, such as polymorphism or encryption. 
Controlling the entropy levels in different parts of a disk resident executable allows an analyst to detect 
malware or a black hat to evade the detection. This paper shows these two perspectives into two scal- 
able entropy-based tools: EnTS and EEE . EnTS, the detection tool, shows the effectiveness of detecting 
entropy patterns, achieving 100% precision with 82% accuracy. It outperforms VirusTotal for accuracy on 
combined Kaggle and VirusShare malware. EEE , the evasion tool, shows the effectiveness of entropy as a 
concealment strategy, attacking binary-based state of the art detectors. It learns their detection patterns 
in up to 8 generations of its search process, and increments their false negative rate from range 0–9%, up 
to the range 90–98.7%. 
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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I  1. Introduction 
Arms races alternate between incremental and disruptive
moves like the stockpiling of armaments and the invention of air-
planes. The malware detection/evasion arms race is no exception.
Its history exhibits periods of minor moves and counter-moves like
tweaking malware to avoid known signature of disruptive moves
like the transition to polymorphic concealment. Our core contri-
bution is to show how to use search to restrict the adversary to
only making disruptive moves. Given an evasion or detection tech-
nique, we use machine learning to search for transformations that
produce variants that force the adversary to make expensive, dis-
ruptive moves. The speciﬁc detection and evasion techniques we
consider use information theoretic entropy. 
To conceal their malware, black hats often rewrite it. Polymor-
phism hides malware by encoding it and decoding it at runtime.
Because it is trivially semantic preserving, it is the dominant way
black hats conceal their malware — in 2016, Webroot reported
that 97% of malware is polymorphic ( Lonas, 2016 ). There are two
main classes of polymorphism: those that encrypt the malware
and those that compress it. ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: h.menendez@ucl.ac.uk (H.D. Menéndez), 
s.bhattacharya@ucl.ac.uk (S. Bhattacharya), david.clark@ucl.ac.uk (D. Clark), 
e.barr@ucl.ac.uk (E.T. Barr). 
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0957-4174/© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uBoth encryption and compression increase the entropy of their
nput, when forced to produce output whose size is not much
arger than the input. Neither Trojans that are large relative to their
osts nor disk-resident malware that hide themselves polymorphi-
ally can violate this constraint without risking becoming too large
nd therefore less viable. In this case, polymorphism introduces
n entropy signature ( Lyda & Hamrock, 2007 ) that distinguishes it
rom many classes of benign-ware. The promise of entropy as a
alware detector is that it works on executables as binary strings,
ithout needing pre-processing, disassembly, dynamic analysis, re-
erse engineering, or manual analysis. 
Structural Entropy ( SEnt ) ( Sorokin, 2011 ) took the ﬁrst step to-
ard effectively exploiting entropy to detect malware when treat-
ng executables solely as binary strings. When a ﬁle is separated
nto chunks, the entropy signature of that ﬁle is its per-chunk en-
ropy. SEnt computes the entropy signature of a ﬁle over small,
xed size chunks. After computing a ﬁle’s entropy signature, SEnt
egments this signature into sequences of chunks, treats these seg-
ents as symbols, then uses Levenshtein to compare the resulting
tring against the segmentation strings it extracts from other ﬁles.
t has two severe limitations. First, it does not scale: it relies on the
airwise comparison ( O ( n 2 )) of a suspicious program with a zoo of
nown malware and benign-ware. Second, its decomposition of an
ntropy signature into segments, whose entropy it compares, relies
n six parameters, three of which are implicit and baked into SEntnder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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E  echnique itself ( Section 4.1 ). The authors do not elucidate the set-
ings of these implicit parameters, nor is it obvious from ﬁrst prin-
iples how they should be set and whether they can be learned.
here are other three explicit parameters: the chunk size that di-
ides the ﬁle into blocks to measure their entropy, the number of
hunks or blocks used and a noise threshold. 
To overcome these limitations, we present a disruptive detec-
ion move called EnTS (Entropy Time Series), a new entropy-based
alware detector. EnTS scales and requires only three explicit pa-
ameters that can be learned from a corpus. EnTS constructs a met-
ic space for entropy signatures. EnTS considers an entropy signa-
ure as a time series, then applies wavelet analysis to clean the
ignature and extract a simpliﬁed signature from the amplitude
nd longitudinal variation in a ﬁle’s entropy. EnTS then treats this
ignature as a point. In this way, EnTS constructs a metric space,
hile SEnt resorts to segmentation and then to the pairwise com-
utation of edit distance to construct its metric space ( Section 2 ).
liminating SEnt ’s segmentation step removes the implicit param-
ters that SEnt requires. The zoo deﬁnes EnTS’ three explicit pa-
ameters: the chunk size, number of chunks, and noise threshold
 Section 4.1 ). 
We designed EnTS to defeat polymorphism. On a corpus that
ncludes the Kaggle and the VirusShare training sets and an equal
umber of benign-ware from download.com , EnTS achieves 82%
ccuracy when maximizing 100% precision and 93.9% accuracy
hen maximizing accuracy. EnTS surpasses the quality of SEnt in
erms of scalability: it is more than 15 times faster and linear in its
ime and memory consumption in contrast to SEnt ’s O ( n 2 ). EnTS’
ccuracy is between 2 to 5 points higher than SEnt ’s in all cases.
nTS is also good at detecting metamorphic malware, not just poly-
orphic, because metamorphic malware often has compressed or
ncrypted regions. It detect all the metamorphic variants from our
est corpus. EnTS outperforms all 56 VirusTotal AV engines 1 ap-
lied to the same data, the best of which achieved only 40.6% ac-
uracy. EnTS’ time complexity is linear in the number of ﬁles be-
ng classiﬁed; it is 30 0 0 times faster than its main competitor in
ccuracy, another information theoretic technique named normal-
zed compression distance ( Li & Vitányi, 2013 ) that we built as a
aseline ( Section 4.1 ). 
Clearly, the next disruptive evasion to defeat EnTS must control
he entropy of packed regions. For this task, we developed EEE
the evolutionary packer or ‘El Empaquetador Evolutivo’). EEE is
 polymorphic engine that controls the entropy of packed regions
nder a tight space budget, increasing the size of its input at most
% ( Section 5 ). EEE creates a packed variant with a speciﬁc en-
ropy signal by creating chunks with a speciﬁc entropy and inject-
ng into the packed binary. To decide position, entropy, and size of
hese chunks, EEE leverages evolutionary computation. EEE is an
nstance of adversarial machine learning; it uses search to exploit
he vulnerabilities of a entropy-based detector in order to fool it
 Section 5 ). 
EEE defeats SEnt , EnTS, and other state of the art binary-based
etection techniques ( Section 6.2 ). EEE explodes the false negative
FN) rates of these techniques: Prior to EEE ’s application, these
echnique’s FN rates range over [0%–9.4%]; after EEE ’s application,
heir FN rates range over [90.8–98.7%]. EEE rapidly learns to defeat
hese tools; It takes two generations to defeat the weakest ones
nd eight to defeat the strongest. To its credit, EnTS resists EEE
etter than the other techniques ( Section 6.3 ). 
EnTS embeds binaries into entropy metric space and uses ma-
hine learning to detect malware and to advance the state of the
rt. Defeating it requires EEE , a disruptive entropy-based evasion1 VirusTotal comprised 56 AV engines at the time of our experiments, 2016. 
/
(echnique that uses search to control the entropy of the binary it
s concealing. 
The main contributions of this paper are: 
• We introduce EnTS ( Section 2 ), the new state of the art in
entropy-based malware detector that operates in linear time.
EnTS detects malware with high accuracy and 100% precision,
achieving better detection rates than any single VirusTotal AV
engine ( Section 4.7 ), outperforming the previous state of the
art and two baselines constructed from normalized compres-
sion distance and compressibility rate ( Section 4.4 ). 
• We introduce EEE ( Section 5 ), a new polymorphic engine that
leverages information theory and adversarial machine learning
to evade detection. EEE defeats all known mechanisms for de-
tecting malware in binaries based on entropy or n-gram, in-
cluding EnTS: it pushes all of their false negative rates over a
90% ( Section 6 ). 
• This work presents a blueprint for how to use search and ma-
chine learning to automate incremental moves ( EEE ’s entropy
signature adaptation), thereby forcing the disadvantaged player
to resort to disruptive moves ( EEE forces expensive dynamic
detection). 
EnTS, EEE , and the corpus on which we evaluated them will be
vailable online 2 
. EnTS: Entropy Time Series Analysis 
The dominant forms of polymorphism hide their payloads us-
ng either compression or encryption. These are string transforma-
ions that change the entropy of their input string. The promise of
tring-based malware detection is that it can distinguish benign-
are from polymorphic malware based on the differences in the
ntropy of their binaries. This is a potentially disruptive move that
ould obsolete the current state of the art polymorphic engines.
n pursuit of this game changing malware detection, we present
nTS 3 , which we designed to advance the state of the art in the
calability and accuracy of string-based malware detection. 
Our goal is to deﬁne entropy-based signatures for code. Shan-
on entropy ( Shannon, 1948 ) is deﬁned over an event sequence,
ence, we must convert strings to event sequences. First, we deﬁne
he event space as the byte sequence within a string, and measure
heir entropy counting the byte frequency. This deﬁnes the entropy
ignature. This method can be applied to any string-based informa-
ion source, like source code. EnTS instantiates this idea for bina-
ies. 
We consider each ﬁle as a stream of chunks (ﬁxed length seg-
ents), each with an associated entropy value. The entropy of each
hunk is calculated from the byte frequencies of that chunk from
hich a probability distribution on the bytes is calculated. As we
ant to compare strings of different lengths, we normalize the sig-
ature to a ﬁxed length. This signature is noisy so we use wavelet
nalysis to clean it. Finally, EnTS leverages machine learning to
lassify the signatures. 
EnTS exploits time series analysis. Time series have been widely
tudied in the literature ( Brockwell & Davis, 2013 ), applied in many
elds, and have often been used for prediction. Typically, time se-
ies are either analysed to estimate the next value ( Chatﬁeld, 20 0 0 )
r grouped by similarity ( Liao, 2005 ). Here, we focus on similarity
n our design of Entropy Time Series or EnTS. 
Like other machine learning malware detection techniques,
nTS requires labelled data ( Dua & Du, 2016 ). It compares a sus-2 EnTS is available at https://github.com/hdg7/EnTS and EEE is available at https: 
/github.com/hdg7/EEE . 
3 EnTS is also part of our technical report on entropy and n-gram based detection 
 Bhattacharya, Menéndez, Barr, & Clark, 2016 ). 
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s  picious binary P against a zoo containing labelled malware and
benign-ware. It considers P to be a malicious if it is more similar
to malware than benign-ware. EnTS creates the classiﬁcation space
from these binaries as follows: 
1. File division: Use the smaller median ﬁle length for the zoo, to
set a ﬁxed number of chunks, N . 
2. Entropy signature: Use a (Procrustean) deterministic algorithm
to choose evenly spread chunks from each ﬁle to produce a vec-
tor of N chunks in order. Calculate the entropy for each chunk
in the vector to obtain an N -vector of entropies. 
3. Wavelet de-noising: Apply a wavelet transform to obtain an N -
vector of smoothed entropies with less trivial variation. 
This N -vector of smoothed entropies forms the time series for
each ﬁle. We can then interpret each time series as a coordinate in
an N -dimensional space and train a machine learning classiﬁer to
distinguish malware and benign-ware. 
2.1. File division 
We compute the entropy signature of a ﬁle, F , as a Discrete
Haar wavelet Transformation ( Section 2.3 ). This requires that the
entropy signature length and, as a consequence, the number of
chunks, N , be a power of 2, i.e. N = 2 α for some α ∈ N : 
α = 
⌈
log 
min { med ian (Z| M ) , med ian (Z| B ) } 
c 
⌉
, 
where Z | B is the zoo’s benign-ware, Z | M is the zoo’s malware and c
is the chunk size . The ceiling operator produces an integer between
the two median lengths for the two sets of binaries. Then, for each
program P , we divide its binary representation into chunks of size
c . 
The chunk size is a critical parameter for EnTS. Chunks are ﬁle
segments but we also considered sliding windows as an alterna-
tive. This was quickly rejected because it adds redundant informa-
tion into the entropy signature. 
Given that the atomic constituents of chunks are bytes, it is
easy to see that a chunk size of 256 bytes is optimal with re-
spect to the amplitude of entropy variation. There are 256 = 2 8 
possible different bytes. According to Cover and Thomas (2012) the
entropy is maximum if and only if the distribution is uniform,
i.e. the entropy of a chunk will be maximal when every possible
byte has equal probability. This corresponds to a uniform distribu-
tion, where every element has the same appearance probability. To
measure the probability of appearance of these 256 elements, we
need, at least, 256 samples composing a chunk. Hence, the mini-
mum chunk size that allows the maximal possible variation in en-
tropy (from 0 to 8 bits) is 256. On the other hand we want as
many chunks as possible in each ﬁle so we also want the length of
chunks to be as small as possible. These chunks provide more in-
formation about the entropy signature, showing granular variations
within it. 
Example. Consider a zoo of just two binary ﬁles, P and Q , and a
chunk size of c . These programs, considered as binary strings, are
divided in chunks. Suppose that length (P ) = 20 c and length (Q ) =
6 c. Each chunk is related to a wavelet coeﬃcient, therefore, the
number of coeﬃcients would be 20 for P and 6 for Q . However,
the Haar wavelet requires 2 α coeﬃcients. Next section shows how
to adapt the width. 
2.2. The entropy signature 
Once we have the chunk division for a ﬁle, we need to reduce
or increment the number of chunks to N , in order to ﬁt the motheravelet, which is explained next in Section 2.3 . The selection pro-
ess of the chunks is equidistant. The ﬁrst and last chunks have
pecial status because ﬁle head and tail are usually relevant parts
n malware analysis. To choose the rest, we calculate an increment
alue inc = (| C| − 1) / (N − 1) to get the next chunk index using the
oor of the accumulation of this factor as the next chosen index.
or each chosen chunk, we calculate its Shannon entropy on the
asis of the byte frequencies of the chunk: 
(C j ) = −
∑ 
b∈ C j 
p(b) log 2 p(b) , (1)
here p ( b ) is the probability of byte b within the j th chunk, C j , of
rogram P , calculated from its frequency count within the chunk. 
The concept of chunk generates a local entropy computation.
herefore repeated chunks will not reduce the entropy. For ex-
mple, imagine a string (0 0 011011) over the alphabet  = { 0 , 1 } 2 .
his string has maximum local entropy, i.e. , chunk entropy. How-
ver, the global entropy H ((0 0 011011) k ) tends to 0, as k → ∞ with
ﬁxed. In this case, local or chunk entropy is maximised, while
lobal entropy is minimized. This problem did not occur in our
ataset and can be easily checked. 
xample. Following the example of Section 2.1 , we need to adapt
he width of P and Q to the Haar wavelet coeﬃcients, which are
 
α . Suppose that we choose α = 3 , then we need N = 2 α = 8 co-
ﬃcients. For P we need to contract the number of chunks from
0 to 8 and for Q we need to increase the number of chunks from
 to 8. In order to choose these chunks, we generate a subset of
he current chunks using a jump factor for each ﬁle. The chunk
ndex is initially set to 0, and it is incremented in every step by
nc 1 = 19 / 7 = 2 . 71 for P and inc 2 = 5 / 7 = 0 . 71 for Q . The indices
re selected using the ﬂoor of the accumulated jump value, so the
hosen indices will be: 
 P = (0 , 2 , 5 , 8 , 10 , 13 , 16 , 19) I Q = (0 , 0 , 1 , 2 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5) 
fter, we only need to calculate the entropy of each chunk, deﬁn-
ng an N-vector of entropy values for each ﬁle which is considered
s an entropy time series. 
.3. Wavelet denoising 
This last step smooths the entropy signal using wavelets. In our
ase, the mother wavelet is deﬁned by: 
 (N, b) = 1 | N| 1 / 2 
| C| ∑ 
j=1 
H(C j ) · HAAR 
(
t j − b 
N 
)
. (2)
here N corresponds with the dimensions of the ﬁnal N -vector
pace, b is a shifting parameter, H ( C j ) are the entropy values, | C |
s the total number of chunks, t j is the current chunk j in the se-
uence and HAAR ( t ) is the Haar wavelet deﬁned by: 
HAAR (t) = 
{ 
1 , 0 ≤ t < 1 / 2 
−1 , 1 / 2 ≤ t < 1 
0 , otherwise 
(3)
he Haar wavelet is chosen because it approximates a step func-
ion from the original function ( Addison, 2002 ). Other wavelets,
uch as Daubechies or Biorthogonal wavelets were considered, but
heir performance was worse and their results were similar to the
aar wavelet. As EnTS focuses on the variation patterns, a noise
ree step function provides all the information it needs about the
ost relevant entropy variations. 
Then, we calculate the discrete Haar wavelet transformation.
ach iteration in the process is divided into two parts: calculat-
ng the scale coeﬃcients and calculating the detail coeﬃcients. The
cale coeﬃcients contain the most relevant information about the
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4 https://www.kaggle.com/c/malware-classiﬁcation . 
5 http://virusshare.com . 
6 http://linux.about.com/library/cmd/blcmdl1 _ xxd.htm . 
7 http://yara.readthedocs.org . 
8 http://yararules.com/ . 
9 https://www.virustotal.com/ . ignal while the detail coeﬃcients contain information about the
mall variations. In each iteration, the coeﬃcients used are the
cale coeﬃcients for the previous iteration, e.g. in iteration number
 only the scale coeﬃcients of iteration 1 are used to calculate the
cale and detail coeﬃcients of iteration 2, and the other wavelet
oeﬃcients are not modiﬁed. According to the Haar wavelet equa-
ions, a scale coeﬃcient is calculated by: 
 
1 
i = 
1 √ 
2 
(x i + x i +1 ) , s αi = 
1 √ 
2 
(s α−1 
i 
+ s α−1 
i +1 ) , α > 1 , 
nd a detail coeﬃcient is calculated by equations: 
 
1 
i = 
1 √ 
2 
(x i − x i +1 ) , d αi = 
1 √ 
2 
(s α−1 
i 
− s α−1 
i +1 ) , α > 1 , 
he scale coeﬃcients are positioned at the beginning of the
avelet and the detail coeﬃcients after the scale coeﬃcients. For
xample, with α = 3 , the iterations generate the coeﬃcients as fol-
ows: 
(x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 6 , x 7 ) 
↓↑ 
(s 1 0 , s 
1 
1 , s 
1 
2 , s 
1 
3 , d 
1 
0 , d 
1 
1 , d 
1 
2 , d 
1 
3 ) ↓↑ 
(s 2 0 , s 
2 
1 , d 
2 
0 , d 
2 
1 , d 
1 
0 , d 
1 
1 , d 
1 
2 , d 
1 
3 ) ↓↑ 
(s 3 0 , d 
3 
0 , d 
2 
0 , d 
2 
1 , d 
1 
0 , d 
1 
1 , d 
1 
2 , d 
1 
3 ) 
In the ﬁnal iteration the wavelet, W , has been constructed. We
an use it to reduce the noise from the entropy time series, us-
ng a threshold, τ , on the wavelet coeﬃcients in this ﬁnal iteration.
hose values that are below the threshold are set to 0. This process
mproves the performance of the classiﬁcation task by eliminating
inor variations in the original signature. 
Lastly, we apply the inverse wavelet transformation to recon-
truct the entropy signature without the noise. 
 i = 
1 √ 
2 
(s 1 k + d 1 k ) , s αk = 
1 √ 
2 
(s α+1 
k 
+ d α+1 
k 
) , α > 0 
 i +1 = 
1 √ 
2 
(s 1 k − d 1 k ) , s αk +1 = 
1 √ 
2 
(s α+1 
k 
− d α+1 
k 
) , α > 0 
The resulting coeﬃcients vary between 0 and 8 because of the
hoice of chunk size and will be used as coordinates of the en-
ropy time series in the classiﬁcation space. This space allows the
reation of scalable models based on machine learning classiﬁers,
nd signiﬁcantly improves the speed of the classiﬁcation process.
he model scales linearly (as we discuss in Section 4.1 and show in
ection 4.6 ) because it does not require a pairwise comparison be-
ween every element on the training data, as other state of the art
lgorithms such as Structural Entropy do ( Sorokin, 2011 ). The clas-
iﬁer will infer a way of discriminating the malware and benign-
are ﬁles within the zoo, focused on targeting 100% precision, that
s one of our main goals. 
xample. Following the examples of Sections 2.1 and 2.2 , We need
o remove noise and simplify each time series by obtaining the
econstruction coeﬃcients. Now, for purposes of illustration, we
ocus on P . We apply the discrete Haar wavelet transformation.
ssume that the entropy values for P are (4,5,4,1,1,2,1,2) then the
avelet transformation process will give us: 
 P | α=1 = (6 . 4 , 3 . 5 , 2 . 1 , 2 . 1 | − 0 . 7 , 2 . 1 , −0 . 7 , −0 . 7) 
 P | α=2 = (7 , 3 | 2 , 0 , −0 . 7 , 2 . 1 , −0 . 7 , −0 . 7) 
 P = (7 | 2 . 8 , 2 , 0 , −0 . 7 , 2 . 1 , −0 . 7 , −0 . 7) 
e apply the threshold, in this example it is 0.75, to W P and we
et 
 P = (7 , 2 . 8 , 2 , 0 , 0 , 2 . 1 , 0 , 0) . hen, we apply the reconstruction process to W P and we get the
econstructed signal as (4.5,4.5,4,1,1.5,1.5,1.5,1.5). These values are
he coordinates of P ’s signature in the space. 
. Experimental data 
We want to study EnTS’ performance on encryption-only,
ompression-only and both encrypting and compressing poly-
orphic engines, so we use three malware datasets: Kaggle
 Kag ) malware competition dataset 4 , packed ( Pck ) malware from
irusShare 5 , and Mix , a dataset that we construct from Kag
nd Pck . EnTS requires labelled benign-ware (Benign) to operate
 Section 2 ) so, for each of these cases, we collect 3 corresponding
enign-ware datasets KagB , PackB , and MixB . 
Kag contains two subsets: train and test. Kaggle’s test subset is
ot labelled, so we train and test on the train subset. It is com-
osed of 10,869 Malware ﬁles. The dataset contains 9 malware
amilies whose features are summarised in Table 1 . The families
re useful for understanding how EnTS works. There are two ﬁles
er malware: a byte representation (hexdump) and an asm ﬁle
ith IDA Pro-information from the disassembly process. We used
xd 6 to convert the hexdumps to binary executables. According to
aggle description, these binaries are not packed. This dataset was
ublished February 2015, and it has become a benchmark on mal-
are analysis, used in more than 50 research papers ( Ronen, Radu,
euerstein, Yom-Tov, & Ahmadi, 2018 ). 
Pck contains Win32 malware whose packing system was
nown, so we focused on malware uploaded to VirusShare in Jan-
ary 2016. This database is composed of approximately 131,0 0 0
alware ﬁles, covering different types of malware. We ﬁlter them
sing Linux ﬁle command. Only those ﬁles identify as PE software
assed this ﬁlter. By combining Yara 7 with packer rules extracted
rom the YaraRules project 8 . We extracted 10,0 0 0 malware with
nown packers. Around 70 speciﬁc packing systems were detected
y Yara, however, several of them came from the same family, so
e focused on the most frequently occurring families ( Table 2 ). 
Mix synthesises Kag and Pck by sampling: one joining dif-
erent types of malware and benign-ware and the second for
istinguishing packed and non-packed software. The former is
ormed by 1 3 from Polymorphic data ( Kag ), 1 3 from Metamor-
hic ( Kag ) and 1 3 from Pck . In industry, white hats often
ust analyse different kinds of malware at the same time. This
ataset aims to emulate this scenario. The second mixed dataset,
ix 2 , is composed by 1 2 packed and 1 2 non-packed ﬁles. This
ataset aims to evaluate our abilities discriminating packed and
on-packed. 
For Benign, we collected 20 0 0 packed benign ( PckB ) and 20 0 0
on-packed benign ﬁles ( KagB ). For Mix the benign-ware mixed
s 2 3 non-packed and 
1 
3 packed (to keep packed and non-packed
roportions), in the ﬁrst case and 1 2 packed, 
1 
2 packed for the
econd case. The resulting datasets have 20 0 0 malware and 20 0 0
enign instances. The benign ﬁles were collected from download.
om . All the benign-ware was submitted to VirusTotal 9 to ensure
hat no anti virus detect it as malware. All the ﬁles are also PE
xecutables and the packed ﬁles are discriminated using Yara. 
EnTS is a classiﬁer ( Section 2 ). The class imbalance problem is
he bane of classiﬁers ( Domingos, 2012 ). In our corpus, malware
utnumbers benign-ware so we uniformly sampled 10,0 0 0 ﬁles
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Table 1 
Information about Kaggle classes:number of instances, instances used in EnTS’ experi- 
ments, concealment strategies and types of malware. 
Class Instances K. 1 K. 2 K. 3 K. 4 K. 5 Conc. Type 
Ramnit 1541 300 255 295 281 287 Poly Worm 
Lollipop 2478 476 427 454 479 443 Poly Adware 
Kelihos_3 2942 550 594 522 540 510 Poly Botnet 
Vundo 475 76 99 83 80 102 Meta Trojan 
Simda 42 7 7 9 8 6 Poly Botnet 
Tracur 751 126 142 150 126 143 Poly Trojan 
Kelihos_1 398 75 65 68 75 77 Encr Botnet 
Obf.ACY 1228 218 232 228 219 230 Meta Trojan 
Gatak 1013 172 179 191 192 202 Poly Trojan 
Total 10,868 
Table 2 
Information about VirusShare packers: number of instances in 
EnTS samples, and instances in SLaMM experiments. 
Packer Total P. 1 P. 2 P. 3 P. 4 P. 5 
Armadillo 542 101 98 111 105 127 
ASPack 186 32 37 42 41 34 
ASProtect 54 10 4 11 17 12 
Borland 2123 417 435 425 438 413 
NET 2351 476 486 483 454 452 
PECompact 445 88 80 89 89 99 
UPX 3175 641 665 610 635 624 
Rest 1124 235 195 229 226 239 
Total 10 0 0 0 
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10 https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/party/index.html . 
11 from the Kag and Pck dataset without replacement and randomly
divided it into ﬁve partitions with equal size ( Tables 1 and 2 ). 
4. Evaluating EnTS 
We built EnTS to be accurate and scalable, here we demonstrate
that it achieves both ends, its accuracy is 93.9% improving over
SEnt by 1.5 points, and the other state of the art up to 8.9 points,
and it scales linearly. 
The evaluation consists of four steps. The ﬁrst is data selection.
In every experiment, we have chosen the same number of malware
and benign-ware instances. The training data consists of two thirds
of the instances and the remaining third comprises the test data.
The test data is always fresh data for either approach and is ran-
domly selected by uniform sampling at the beginning of the pro-
cess. The second step consists of the feature space generation for
classiﬁcation in EnTS. Once this is prepared, we train a classiﬁer as
appropriate. After, we evaluate malware detection on the test set,
recording the accuracy and the false positive rate. 
4.1. Algorithms and Parameters for EnTS study 
To compare against EnTS, we implemented three other infor-
mation theoretic features of binary strings from the literature as
baselines. The ﬁrst is the compression rate (CR) which calculates
the ratio of the compressed length to the uncompressed length
for a given ﬁle compressor and is related to the Kolmogorov com-
plexity of the speciﬁc ﬁle ( Li & Vitányi, 2013 ). We chose LZMA2 as
the compressor and its maximum compression parameters and the
maximum windows size, i.e. , 4GB, using the package 7zip . 
The second is the Normalised Compression Distance (NCD),
which approximates the Normalised Information Distance ( Li &
Vitányi, 2013 ), a universal, generic, information theoretic metric.
Formally, NCD is 
NC D (P, Q ) = C (P Q ) − min { C (P ) , C (Q ) } 
max { C (P ) , C (Q ) } , here P, Q are strings, PQ is their concatenation, and C ( · ) is the
ompressed size function for a speciﬁed compressor. NCD also uses
ZMA2 as the compressor. 
Finally, we compare against Structural Entropy ( SEnt ). Sorokin
ntroduced this technique in 2011 ( Sorokin, 2011 ) and Baysa et al.
pplied it to metamorphic malware in 2013 ( Baysa, Low, & Stamp,
013 ). It divides a ﬁle into chunks, calculates the entropy of each
hunk, then groups the chunks into arbitrarily sized segments (the
nformation for each segment is its average entropy and its size).
t generates a similarity matrix, performing a pairwise compari-
on on the ﬁles based on Levenshtein distance. This approach is
 ( n 2 ), where n is the number of ﬁles. Further, the variable number
nd variable size of segments in a ﬁle means this approach may
etermine a ﬁle with more segments to be totally different from
nother ﬁle with fewer segments even though the overall entropy
attern in the two ﬁles is similar. EnTS escapes this problem: it
xtracts a ﬁxed length entropy time series from a ﬁle as a token
tream and operates directly on this time series and therefore all
f the ﬁle’s information at once. The implicit parameters chosen
or this comparison are the same as those used in both Baysa and
orokin’s work: τ = 0 . 3 , c  = 0 . 6 and c α = 1 . 4 . 
EnTs has three parameters: the chunk size, signature size, and
he wavelet threshold. In this experiment we set the chunk size
o 256 ( Section 2.1 ). The signature size ( i.e. the number of dimen-
ions) is 512 (2 9 ) because the smaller zoo (packed ﬁles) has an av-
rage size of 116 KB ( α = 
 log (116 · 2 10 / 2 8 )  = 9 , Section 2.2 ). The
avelet threshold is 0.5 ( Section 2.3 ). 
EnTS uses two classic classiﬁcation algorithms: Random Forest 10 
nd Inference Trees 11 . To optimize ﬁnding the boundary between
alware and benign-ware for each measure, we used multiple-
earning to combine these two algorithms. Multi-learning divides
he learning process, specialising it to different regions of the
pace. Multi-learning penalises false positives during construction
 Hothorn, Lausen, Benner, & Radespiel-Tröger, 2004 ). 
.2. EnTS’ accuracy 
EnTS was designed to detect polymorphic malware. “How accu-
ate it is at detecting all types of malware?” Following related work
 Section 7 ), we consider a detector to be accurate when its accu-
acy is at least 90%. EnTS uses a classiﬁer ( Section 2 ). To determine
ow much of its performance is due to its machine learning classi-
er and how much to its similarity metric, we compared EnTS with
ther information theory similiarity measures, using the same pa-
ameters and classiﬁer and ask: “How does EnTS’ accuracy compare
o that of other information theory similarity measures?”
NCD and SEnt generate a similarity matrix while EnTS and CR
escribe point coordinates for the signatures and the compressionhttps://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/party/index.html . 
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Table 3 
Accuracy Results for all datasets and techniques. The best results are remarked 
in bold. The second best results are remarked in italic. The and symbols 
indicate whether a technique is statistically better or worse to EnTS respectively, 
according to the Wilcoxon test. 
Data NCD CR SEnt EnTS 
Kag 1 93.9 ± 0.3 91.7 ± 0.1 94.5 ± 0.2 98.1 ± 0.1 
Kag 2 94.1 ± 0.2 90.5 ± 0.3 94.1 ± 0.2 98.2 ±0.2 
Kag 3 94.0 ± 0.3 90.5 ± 0.0 93.7 ± 0.3 97.8 ±0.2 
Kag 4 94.0 ± 0.3 91.6 ± 0.0 94.4 ± 0.2 97.5 ±0.1 
Kag 5 95.4 ± 0.3 90.6 ± 0.1 93.9 ± 0.2 98.0 ±0.1 
Pck 1 95.4 ±0.2 82.2 ± 0.2 92.0 ± 0.2 94.1 ± 0.2 
Pck 2 95.1 ±0.2 83.0 ± 0.1 93.1 ± 0.2 94.3 ± 0.2 
Pck 3 95.1 ±0.2 81.2 ± 0.2 91.1 ± 0.2 94.0 ± 0.2 
Pck 4 95.1 ±0.2 83.3 ± 0.2 93.0 ± 0.2 95.1 ±0.2 
Pck 5 95.7 ±0.2 81.1 ± 0.2 92.3 ± 0.2 94.1 ± 0.2 
Mix 1 91.7 ± 0.3 85.0 ± 0.1 92.4 ± 0.2 93.9 ±0.2 
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Table 4 
False positives and true positives rates for all techniques and 
datasets. The ROC curve that has been chosen is the median of all 
the ROC curves generated during the experimental process. Italic 
characters highlight the best results for different cut-off values. 
Bold characters highlight the best results with 0 false positives and 
the highest false positive tolerance. 
0 0.002 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 
Kag NCD 0.67 0.76 0.86 0.96 0.98 0.99 
Kag CR 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.70 0.91 0.96 
Kag SEnt 0.44 0.60 0.72 0.92 0.98 0.99 
Kag EnTS 0.38 0.70 0.93 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Pck NCD 0.19 0.26 0.55 0.96 0.98 0.99 
Pck CR 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.55 0.75 0.79 
Pck SEnt 0.20 0.25 0.39 0.88 0.95 0.96 
Pck EnTS 0.18 0.26 0.53 0.94 0.98 0.99 
Mix 1 NCD 0.61 0.67 0.77 0.89 0.94 0.96 
Mix 1 CR 0.00 0.21 0.26 0.58 0.81 0.83 
Mix 1 SEnt 0.29 0.34 0.45 0.82 0.95 0.97 
Mix 1 EnTS 0.64 0.67 0.76 0.92 0.97 0.98 
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p  ate, respectively. Applying machine learning to EnTS and CR is
traightforward because we have the points and we only need to
iscriminate them. For NCD and SEnt we consider each row of
he training similarity matrix as coordinates, due to the number
f ﬁles is ﬁxed. This provides the points that the machine learning
lgorithm uses. For testing, we will consider the coordinates as the
imilarities among the test ﬁles and the training ﬁles. The machine
earning algorithms chosen are non-deterministic approaches (they
hoose a random seed during the initialization process), then, we
eed to generate different models to measure their median per-
ormance ( Hothorn et al., 2004 ). Hence, each experiment has been
arried out 100 times, and the median and standard deviation have
een provided to compare the results. Furthermore, in order to
ompare different algorithms, we have applied the Wilcoxon test
o evaluate whether there is statistical signiﬁcance among the re-
ults or not. We consider that there is statistical signiﬁcance when
he p value is less than 0.05 using EnTS as benchmark. In order
o reduce the redundancy of correlated variables in the space, we
ave eliminated those dimensions whose Pearson correlation was
igher than 0.8 with respect to other dimension. This reduces the
pace to the 5% of the original dimension. 
Table 3 shows the direct comparison between the four tech-
iques discriminating malware and benign-ware, according to the
ccuracy. It divides the results by technique and provides the accu-
acy of applying each algorithm to the speciﬁc datasets described
n Section 3 . For Kag , EnTS and NCD generally obtain the best re-
ults (EnTS is over 97% of accuracy in all cases and NCD over 93%).
Ent is always worse than EnTS and CR is the worst approach. For
ck , all techniques reduce their accuracy but NCD, which incre-
ents its discrimination abilities. EnTS and NCD keep competitive
esults compare with the rest of the techniques (over 94% and 95%
n all cases). Mix 1 shows that EnTS and SEnt are better discrimi-
ating malware and benign-ware than the other techniques (93.9%
nd 91.7% of accuracy, respectively) when the dataset mixes packed
nd non-packed binaries. NCD obtains worse results than in the
revious cases and CR is the worst technique. This analysis shows
hat EnTS and SEnt are the best techniques classifying malware,
hen no previous information about the malware has been ob-
ained. 
indings. We originally asked whether EnTS is accurate. Targeting
ccuracy, it obtains 98.0% in Kag , 94.1% in Pck and 93.9% in Mix .
e also compared EnTS to the other techniques. EnTS is more ac-
urate than CR and SEnt , and similar to NCD. These results show
hat NCD and EnTS are competitive classiﬁers in all cases, although
nTS scales 30 0 0 times better ( Section 4.6 ). CR does not detect any
alware that the other techniques do not also detect; EnTS easily
efeats SEnt . .3. EnTS’ precision 
One of the main aims of a malware detector is to reduce false
ositives, and, as a consequence, improve precision ( Section 7 ). We
sk “Does EnTS accurately and precisely detect malware?”. We aim
o achieve a precision of 100% ( i.e. there are no false positives).
ue to the classiﬁcation nature of EnTS we use the ROC curve to
ecide a cut-off during its validation process. We compared EnTS
ith the other information theory similarity measures, using the
ame parameters and classiﬁer and ask: “How does EnTS’ accuracy
nd precision compare to that of other information theory similarity
easures, like NCD?”
Improving precision is equivalent to reducing false positives.
he classiﬁer penalizes false positives during the learning process,
s mentioned above, to ensure that the model effectively detects
alicious programs. The cut-off or threshold used in the ROC curve
lso provides a conﬁdence value to the random forest voting sys-
em that helps to reduce false positives. Using 10 cross-fold valida-
ion in the training set, we set the cut-off to the most conservative
alue, i.e. the one that ensures 0 false positives in all validation
ets. It is this last model that we apply to the test data. 
Table 4 shows the median results for the ROC curves for all the
xperiments. In this table, we can see how the threshold variation
odiﬁes the true/false positives rates for each dataset. For Kag ,
nTS detects 38% of malware with 100% precision ( i.e. 0 false pos-
tive), NCD detects 67% and SEnt detects 44%. For Pck , EnTS de-
ection rate is reduced to 18%, NCD to 19% and SEnt to 20%. For
ix , NCD improves its results signiﬁcantly (61%), as well as EnTS
64%). This table shows that EnTS only outperforms all techniques
ith 100% precision, when the data is mixed, in the other scenar-
os there are not signiﬁcant improvements. These results also dis-
ard CR as a classiﬁer targeting the 100% precision. After setting
he threshold to the 100% precision, the median accuracy achieved
y EnTS for Kag is 69.0%, for Pck is 59.0% and for Mix is 82.0%. 
We aim to understand why EnTS obtains better results in some
peciﬁc cases and why it is not performing as well as the other
echniques with respect to the precision. 
First, the results suggest that EnTS can easily separate non-
acked malware and benign-ware. In order to provide an intuition
bout how this separation is performed we have generated a t-
NE ( Maaten & Hinton, 2008 ) projection of Mix . This projection
ims to show, in a low-level dimensional space (normally 2 or 3
imensions) the separation among the data instances in their orig-
nal (usually high-level dimensional) space, according to a speciﬁc
etric, in our case, the Euclidean distance. During the mapping
rocess, which generates the projection, t-SNE aims to keep coher-
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Fig. 1. t-SNE projections of NCD and EnTS spaces using Mix data. While the borders are fuzzy, both techniques achieve good global separation; NCD’s clustering is more 
compact, but comes at great computational cost. 
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a  ence among those instances that are close in the high dimensional
space, setting them close in the low dimensional space. Compared
with other projection techniques like Isomap, Sammon mapping or
a Locally Linear-Embedding, t-SNE performs better showing high
dimensional data discrimination based on their manifolds struc-
ture ( Maaten & Hinton, 2008 ). It is effective with space of similar
dimensions to us, for instance, Maaten and Hinton showed its per-
formance projecting spaces of 784, 10,304 and 1024 dimensions to
2 and 3. Our space contains 512 dimensions ( Section 4.1 ), hence
our dimensionality is inside the projection bounds. 
Fig. 1 shows the results of this projection for EnTS and NCD.
During the discrimination process, the application of Random For-
est helps to discriminate those sections which are fuzzier, due to
the multi-learner approach, that sets different trees in these sec-
tions to ensure a clearer discrimination. To analyse the false posi-
tive rate, we focus on those black instances (benign) invading red
clusters (malware). If a black instance is in the middle of a red
cluster, it will be considered as malware with high probability.
Therefore, even when the cut-off is more conservative, it will still
be misclassiﬁed. In Fig. 1 we can see this phenomena in both: EnTS
and NCD. In this case of NCD this normally happens closer to the
boundary. The cut-off sets this whole boundary section as benign,
to reduce false positives. EnTS has wider red regions free of black
instances. However, the boundary of these regions are problematic,
due to they are covered by several black instances. This forces the
cut-off to consider the boundary as benign-ware. 
Findings. We asked whether EnTS is accurate and precise. It is pre-
cise: it obtains 100% precision. However, it falls short of the 90%
accuracy bar. It obtains 64% accuracy on Mix , 38% on Kag and 18%
on Pck . Again, EnTS is more accurate than CR and SEnt , and sim-
ilar to NCD. 
4.4. EnTS’ accuracy by family 
We want to go deeper in the speciﬁc concealment strategies
used by the families and packing systems and how they affect the
performance of each technique. This leads us to ask: “How do the
different f amilies and packers affect EnTS and the other baselines?”
Table 5 breaks down the results from Table 3 in families ( Kag ),
packing systems ( Pck ) and strategies ( Mix ). This only increments
the granularity of the binary classiﬁcation in order to detect how
different families or packers affect it. For Pck , NCD achieves theest performance in almost all cases, followed by EnTS, but NCD’s
ime and memory performance is signiﬁcantly lower ( Section 4.6 ).
ll techniques are good discriminating Armadillo system, as well as
ET. For Kag families, we can see that NCD and EnTS outperforms
he rest of techniques in all cases. This also shows the effectiveness
f EnTS when it is applied to metamorphic malware. Due to meta-
orphic malware has not intuitive entropy variations we focus on
he two speciﬁc families: Vundo and Obfuscator.ACY. Vundo was
reviously studied by Li et al., who provided a description about
he metamorphic engine ( Li, Loh, & Tan, 2011 ). This description
entions that the data section is encrypted or compressed, there-
ore this produces entropy variations that can be detected by EnTS.
his fact is also detected in the entropy signature, where there are
ong sections with higher entropy than others. For Obfuscator.ACY
he previous pattern is also frequent in the entropy signature, but
n smaller sections, probably related to encrypted or compressed
trings. These variation patterns make the metamorphic data to-
ally unique for EnTS, and it is the reason it can easily detect them.
or Mix , the best results are for polymorphic and metamorphic
ata, applying NCD and EnTS. For Pck , NCD is the best, followed,
n this case, by SEnt which is close to EnTS. 
indings. We wondered how different concealment strategies af-
ect EnTS and the other baselines. EnTS and NCD are strong against
olymorphism and, surprisingly, metamorphism. They can handle
peciﬁc families and packers, forcing malware writers to create
ew ones. 
.5. Packed and non-packed 
The current state of the art is focused on distinguishing be-
ween packed and non-packed software, this leads us to ask: “How
oes EnTS’ detect packing compared with the other information theory
imilarity measures?”
EnTS and NCD are accurate detecting malware in different
acked and non-packed zoos, this section aims to analyse their
bility to discriminate between packed and non-packed software.
ix 2 dataset was designed to fulﬁl this goal: the dataset con-
ains 50% packed and 50% non-packed binaries, mixing malware
nd benign-ware in the same proportions. 
The accuracy values for distinguishing packed and non-packed
re: 88.1 ± 0.7 for NCD, 69.4 ± 0.3 for CR, 82.1 ± 0.4 for SEnt
nd 88.9 ± 0.3 EnTS. According to Wilcoxon test, EnTS and NCD
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Table 5 
Breakdown of Table 3 results by malware families in Kag , packing systems in Pck 
and concealment strategy in Mix . Bold characters highlight the best results and italic 
character the second. Underlined characters highlight results higher to a 99%. 
Dataset Class NCD CR SEnt EnTS 
Kag Ramnit 97.9 ± 0.7 95.6 ±0.3 96.1 ±1.1 98.8 ±0.4 
Lollipop 97.9 ± 0.5 94.6 ±0.2 96.0 ±0.8 99.2 ±0.3 
Kelihos3 98.2 ±0.7 93.8 ±0.3 95.5 ±0.8 98.9 ±0.2 
Vundo 97.4 ± 1.2 94.9 ±0.1 92.8 ±1.8 98.0 ±0.4 
Simda 95.0 ± 2.5 97.1 ±1.6 97.1 ±0.0 100.0 ±0.0 
Tracur 99.5 ±1.4 94.2 ±0.2 96.6 ±1.4 98.6 ±0.4 
Kelihos1 98.4 ± 1.2 97.0 ±0.5 94.6 ±2.7 100.0 ±0.9 
Obf.ACY 98.7 ±0.8 93.8 ±0.2 96.1 ±1.0 97.6 ±0.6 
Gatak 98.2 ± 0.8 93.2 ±0.3 96.2 ±1.2 99.3 ±0.5 
Pck Armadillo 99.5 ±0.3 94.7 ±0.6 95.7 ±0.5 97.3 ±0.3 
ASPack 91.6 ±3.7 59.3 ±2.5 80.2 ±3.2 88.8 ± 3.6 
ASProtect 80.0 ± 7.4 36.0 ±0.0 58.0 ±4.9 88.0 ±7.5 
Borland 97.1 ±0.5 78.3 ±0.6 84.3 ±1.2 88.8 ± 1.0 
NET 99.6 ±0.1 95.2 ±0.2 98.7 ±0.4 99.2 ± 0.3 
PEComp 91.4 ± 4.4 70.1 ±2.5 94.3 ±1.1 91.4 ± 1.3 
UPX 97.0 ±0.3 76.8 ±0.6 92.5 ±0.5 94.6 ± 0.7 
Rest 91.7 ±0.9 77.9 ±1.1 77.8 ±1.7 82.4 ± 1.6 
Mix Meta 100.0 ±0.0 95.9 ±0.3 96.8 ±0.5 100.0 ±0.0 
Poly 99.6 ±0.2 95.5 ±0.3 98.2 ±0.4 99.6 ±0.1 
Packed 86.9 ±0.8 65.8 ±0.2 85.1 ±0.7 81.5 ±1.0 
Table 6 
False positives and true positives rates for all techniques and Mix 
2 dataset. The ROC curve that has been chosen is the median of 
all the ROC curves generated during the experimental process. Bold 
characters highlight the best results. 
0 0.002 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 
Mix 2 NCD 0.27 0.29 0.44 0.75 0.88 0.95 
Mix 2 CR 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.31 0.42 0.51 
Mix 2 SEnt 0.16 0.24 0.38 0.57 0.71 0.79 
Mix 2 EnTS 0.51 0.53 0.64 0.81 0.88 0.92 
Table 7 
Average time results for the different methods and all the 
databases. Time is approximated in minutes (m) and days. Bold 
characters highlight the best results. 
NCD CR SEnt EnTS 
Kag Space Gen > 5 days 30 m 40 m 2 m 
Kag Classiﬁcation 25 m 0.4 m 3 m 0.5 m 
Kag Total > 5 days 30.4 m 43 m 2.5m 
Pck Space Gen > 5days 30 m 40 m 2 m 
Pck Classiﬁcations 25 m 0.4 m 3 m 0.5 m 
Pck Total > 5 days 30.4 m 43 m 2.5m 
Mix Space Gen > 5 days 30 m 40 m 2 m 
Mix Classiﬁcation 25 m 0.4 m 3 m 0.5 m 
Mix Total > 5 days 30.4 m 43 m 2.5m 
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sesults are not signiﬁcantly different. Table 6 shows the detection
ercentage considering packed as the detection target. It illustrates
hat EnTS overcomes the rest of the techniques specially for 0 false
ositives. 
indings. After comparing EnTS packing detection abilities with
he other techniques, we discovered that EnTS is more accurate
han CR and SEnt and similar to NCD. EnTS also performs better
han the other techniques when the target precision is 100%. 
.6. Scalability 
We explore the scalability by asking: “Does EnTS scale better
han NCD, CR and SEnt ?”Table 7 shows the average time consump-
ion of the techniques for training and testing. The table is divided
n three datasets ( Kag , Pck and Mix ), and three speciﬁc values:
he space generation or training (where the algorithms generatehe similarity matrices, entropy signatures or the compressibility
alues), the classiﬁcation process and the total average time. EnTS
utperforms every single technique. We can also see that NCD is
he most impractical technique, taking 2 days in the best case and
 in the worse. This shows that NCD is not optimal for malware
etection. It is a consequence of the ﬁle compression and the pair-
ise comparison to generate the similarity matrix. The compres-
ion process also affects to CR which needs more time to calcu-
ate the ratios. The pairwise comparison affects to NCD and SEnt .
nTS uses no pairwise comparison, and this improves the time
onsumption. Besides, the entropy signature generation and the
avelet decomposition are linear processes, they do not generate
 bottleneck during the analysis. 
The memory consumption of each metric grows depending on
he space size. For NCD and SEnt , this space is related to the simi-
arity matrix, which grows as O ( P 2 ) while EnTS grows linearly O ( P )
ccording to the number of programs, P , due to the number of co-
ﬃcients (or coordinates) used in the space is ﬁxed. CR also grows
inearly according to the number of ﬁles. 
The time consumption ranking for the techniques and for
atasets containing 20 0 0 malware and 20 0 0 benign-ware starts
ith NCD consuming more than ﬁve days. It follows with SEnt
onsuming 43 min, CR consuming 40.3 min and ﬁnally EnTS con-
uming only 2.5 min. The equivalent memory consumption rank-
ng starts with NCD and SEnt consuming a big square similarity
atrix ( O ( P 2 )). It follows with EnTS and CR as O ( P ) techniques. 
indings. EnTS does scale better than NCD, SEnt and CR. It is linear
calable, 10 times faster than the second fastest technique. 
.7. EnTS vs AV Engines 
This last part of the study was focused on comparing EnTS with
ommecial tools. We ask: “Can EnTS improve the detection results of
he AV engines?”
We have compared EnTS with 56 Anti-Virus Engines. For this
omparison, we have sent all the test set from the Kag , Pck and
ix to Virus Total. In the case of Pck , all the data was already
lassiﬁed as Malware using this system, but Kag is fresher and
here are a few anti-virus that can detect it. Table 8 shows the
omparison between the best engines related to accuracy. We can
ee that EnTS and NCD obtain the best accuracy results. 
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Table 8 
Comparison between the top ten Anti-Virus 
Engines, EnTS, CR, SEnt and NCD according 
to detection. 
Technique Kag Pck Mix 
EnTS 98.9% 93.0% 93.7% 
CR 94.4% 81.7% 85.7% 
SEnt 95.6% 90.5% 93.4% 
NCD 98.2% 96.7% 95.5% 
Avast 29.1% 83.5% 40.6% 
AVG 0.3% 86.1% 27.5% 
Avira 6.4% 23.5% 11.8% 
ESET 0.0% 87.1% 28.2% 
GData 0.0% 87.5% 27.8% 
Ikarus 0.6% 86.6% 27.2% 
McAffe 0.0% 89.4% 28.8% 
Qihoo 4.3% 61.2% 24.0% 
VBA32 0.1% 73.4% 23.2% 
VIPRE 0.0% 88.1% 27.5% 
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pFindings. We ﬁnd that EnTS outperforms all the 56 AV Engines in
term of accuracy up to 69 points for the best anti-virus using the
Kaggle data. 
4.8. Discussion 
The results suggest that EnTS quality depends on the sparsity of
the data in the space. When the data is more sparse, i.e. , when the
entropy signatures are different among them, it is more diﬃcult for
the classiﬁer to ﬁnd a good discrimination, however, in the oppo-
site situation, it is clear that the variants generate small clusters in
the space, where the families or the packers are set together. EnTS
space is based on the signatures, it does not depend on the data,
therefore the classiﬁer can be easily transported to detect other
malware or retrain with new malware, keeping no information of
the original training data. Zero-day malware, which is totally differ-
ent to all the previous data and more likely to benign-ware, might
be a countermeasure for EnTS, but if black hats aims to repack or
re-conceal variants from current malware they will ﬁnd limitations
set by EnTS (we will discuss this fact in the following section). 
NCD’s quality roots in the compressor: when NCD assigns a
high similarity, the strings have patterns that can be identiﬁed
by the compressor after the concatenation. However, when NCD
sets two strings as different, it is not conﬁdent, because if one
of the objects is already compressed, the distance will be maxi-
mum. NCD space is based on similarities, therefore, the object se-
lection will affect the space construction. In this case, the fact that
we work with speciﬁc families and packers improve the abilities
during the detection process, because they are more likely to be
similar among them. On the other hand, the scalability of NCD is
extremely problematic if we want to use this technique as an on-
line detector. However, EnTS is almost 30 0 0 times faster than NCD
for the zoos we had studied. 
Next section will be focused on ﬁnding a potential countermea-
sure generating variants for EnTS. 
5. EEE : the evolutionary packer 
EnTS advances the state of the art in entropy-based malware
detection, achieving an unprecedented combination of speed and
accuracy. Is it a disruptive move? To answer this question, we im-
mediately take the next step in the malware detection arms race
and present EEE (the evolutionary packer or “El Empaquetador
Evolutivo”), an EnTS countermeasure. EEE manipulates the entropy
signature of the binaries to create malware variants. It injects con-
trolled entropy regions (CERs) into the binary ﬁle and learns howany CERs to create and where to put them. In so doing, EEE de-
eats EnTS and all other frequency-based malware detectors. 
Fig. 2 shows EEE workﬂow. It uses a malware binary and a
etector as starting points ( Algorithm 1 ). The malware contains
lgorithm 1 EEE evolutionary process. 
nput: P is the input program. 
Det Malware detector. 
utput: P ∗ is the best program variant. 
1: ˆ P = Compress (P ) 
2: Create an initial population of Chromosomes: Pop
3: for i = 0 to Total_Generations do 
4: for all C ∈ Pop do 
5: for all d i ∈ C.D do 
6: for j = 0 to d i . Num do 
7: // cers is a priority queue sorted by position 
8: cers . enqueue ( d .N ∗ | ˆ  P | , d . Size , d . Density ) 
9: cers . removeOutOfRange() 
10: cers . NormalizeSize (| P | − | ˆ  P | ) 
11: P ′ := inject( ˆ  P , cers , C. Del ) 
12: C.ﬁtness = Det.DetectionProb( P ′ ) 
13: P ∗ = arg max (Det.DetectionProb( P ′ ),Det.DetectionProb( P ∗)) 
14: Pop = reproduction (Pop) + selection (Pop) 
15: Pop.crossov er() 
16: Pop.mutate () 
17: return P ∗. 
he malicious semantics, which is not modiﬁed. EEE changes
he malware shape injecting CERs ( Section 5.1 ). This produces
ariants whose new features aim to produce a misclassiﬁcation
n the detector. Due to the manipulation process might not be
nough, we include a learning process, based on genetic algorithms
 Section 5.2 ). EEE learns to create and place the CERs based on the
ariant’s classiﬁcation score, which feeds the ﬁtness function of the
earning process. Every variant generated is executable and it runs
s the original malware after the unpacking process performed in
untime ( Section 5.3 ). 
The adversarial machine learning process of EEE is embedded
nto the ﬁtness function. Every time that EEE generates a new vari-
nt with the aim of reducing the classiﬁcation abilities of the ma-
hine learning based malware detector, it is playing adversary to
he machine learning algorithm. From an adversarial perspective,
EE has access to the classiﬁer and can get the classiﬁcation prob-
bility, but it does not know which speciﬁc features needs to be
odiﬁed, that information is learnt during the search process de-
ending on the response from the malware detector. 
.1. Controlled entropy regions. 
EEE introduces controlled entropy regions (CERs) anywhere in
he binary ﬁle. A CER is a set of random bytes constructed so that
he entropy of the byte distribution is under our control. EEE sets
 delimiter, Del , at the starting and at the ending points of each
ER for bounding them. This delimiter identiﬁes the CERs into the
inary. Three parameters control the generation of controlled en-
ropy regions: Size , Density and a Gaussian probability distribu-
ion sampled to select their placement position (described by its
ean μ and standard deviation σ ). The Size parameter is given
s the percentage of the available size a region can use. The Den-
ity parameter is a number between 0 and 1 used to calculate the
ercentage of bytes used in the CER from the 256 possible bytes.
he probability distribution is a Normal distribution over the in-
erval [0,1]. EEE samples this distribution and multiplies the value
btained by the size of the compressed ﬁle to deﬁne an insertion
oint. 
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Fig. 2. The architecture of EEE , the Evolutionary Packer, showing the initialization of the packer and the GA at top, the interactions among the components of EEE and the 
interaction with the malware detector at bottom. 
Fig. 3. Modiﬁcations on the original binary performed by EEE . First, the original 
ﬁle is compressed. After, the controlled entropy regions are set. Depending on their 
position they lie between different pieces of the compressed program. 
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the number of CERs for that descriptor, the Size , the Density , and the parameters 
for the position distribution. 
5
 
s  
w  
T  
i
 
v  
s  
e  
(
 
I  
i  
p  
a  
c  
4  
i  
a  
t  
b  
t  
f  
i  
a  
n  
e  
c  
c  
a  
s  
o  
l  To construct a CER, we sample bytes from a uniform distribu-
ion until the number sampled over 255 reaches or exceeds the
ensity . We concatenate these bytes in sampling order into an
nitial string, then construct a new string by repeating that initial
tring until the desired length is reached, based on Shannon’s en-
ropy deﬁnition ( Eq. (1) ) so this method achieves the maximum
ntropy possible for the probability distribution on byte frequen-
ies in the CER. For example, imagine three strings, 111111, 121212
nd 123123. The entropy of the ﬁrst is 0, as the probability of 1
s maximum. The entropy of the second is 1, as the probability
or each value is 0.5. The entropy for the third is 1.58 because the
robability for each value is 1 3 , and so on. The entropy increases as
e introduce values until our string contains all 256 bytes, when
he entropy is maximum, i.e. , 8. 
A ﬁxed number of CER descriptors limits the CER search
pace. Descriptors deﬁne a set of CERs sharing similar proper-
ies. Descriptors are formed by a Size , a Density , and a pair of
ormal distribution parameters. Formally, a CER descriptor d =
( Num , Size , Density , μ, σ ) , where Num represents the number of
ERs instantiated on this descriptor. The number of descriptors
nd their characteristics are parameters for the genetic search al-
orithm ( Section 5.2 ). 
For giving room to the CERs without signiﬁcantly increment-
ng the ﬁle size, we start compressing the binary. After, we instan-
iate the CER descriptors creating Num CERs per descriptor. Each
ER has a memory position ranged from 0 to the size of the com-
ressed area. There is a low probability to generate out-of-range
ERs, due to the Gaussian distribution. Those CERs are removed.
he size of the CER depends on the available area, i.e. , the differ-
nce between the original binary size and the compressed size. We
im to not create a variant bigger than the original malware, af-
er the CER injection (within a 1% of tolerance). This allows EEE
o work with compressed binaries. The CERs sizes are normalized
ccording to the available size. After setting their ﬁnal size, EEE
njects the CERs ( Fig. 3 ) between two delimiters ( Del ). .2. Genetic CER creation and placement 
The genetic algorithm looks for the best combination of CER de-
criptors and delimiters ( Algorithm 1 ). They form the chromosome,
here the CER parameters become the encoding or search space.
he number of descriptors is ﬁxed to limit the size of this space,
mproving the performance. 
EEE encodes the CER descriptors parameters into a real valued
ector, which serves as a chromosome during EEE ’s search. Fig. 4
hows the components of a chromosome: delimiter ( Del ), and, for
ach region descriptor: Density , Size , μ, σ and number of regions
 Num ). 
The adversarial search process runs as given in Algorithm 1 .
t starts compressing the original program P → ˆ P and creat-
ng a population of chromosomes ( Pop ) that represents different
arametrizations for the CERS (lines 1 and 2). These chromosomes
re created by sampling from a uniform distribution. Then for each
hromosome, it creates the CERs, as explained in Section 5.1 (lines
 to 10), and injects them into the compressed program ˆ P , creat-
ng a program variant P ′ (line 11). This variant remains executable,
s explained in 5.3 . The algorithm measures the variant’s quality
o calculate the chromosome’s ﬁtness (line 12). If this ﬁtness is
etter than the best variant found during the whole search so far,
his record ( P ∗) of the best variant is updated (line 13). The ﬁtness
unction, which guides the search, is the malicious class probabil-
ty provided by the malware detector we seek to defeat. The search
ims to minimize this value. Once the algorithm ends with the ﬁt-
ess computation of each chromosome, it applies four genetic op-
rations to the population (lines 14 to 16): reproduction (chooses
hromosomes for crossover), elitism selection (chooses the best
hromosomes for use in the next generation), crossover (swaps
 random number of common parameters between two chromo-
omes) and mutation (sets new values for a chromosome). These
perations improve the population’s quality using the information
earnt from the previous generation. When there are no improve-
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Table 9 
Feature space, machine learning strategy and test accuracy for the 7 models we attack using EEE. 
Technique Features Strategy Accuracy FNs 
Structural Entropy ( Baysa et al., 2013 ) Entropy segments Random Forest 91.6% 7.4% 
EnTS Entropy signatures Random Forest 93.5% 9.4% 
Kolter ( Kolter & Maloof, 2006 ) 4-grams vector Boosted J48 95.2% 0.0% 
Kolter ( Kolter & Maloof, 2006 ) 4-grams vector SVM 89.3% 7.2% 
Kolter ( Kolter & Maloof, 2006 ) 4-grams vector Boosted SVM 91.7% 6.4% 
McBoost( Perdisci et al., 2008 ) 2-grams vector Bagging J48 95.5% 2.8% 
McBoots( Perdisci et al., 2008 ) 3-grams vector Bagging J48 93.2% 6.8% 
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u  ments in the population, or after a ﬁxed number of generations,
the search process stops, and the algorithm returns P ∗, the ﬁttest
individual (line 17). 
5.3. Modifying UPX to produce EEE 
EEE implementation is based on UPX ( Oberhumer, Molnár, &
Reiser, 2004 ) packer. UPX reformats binaries, compressing their
sections and creating a new binary with three sections: (1) UPX0
an empty section where the code is uncompressed; (2) UPX1 the
compressed original binary and the uncompression code (named
stub); and (3) UPX2 a section containing all imports to properly
run the binary. 
When an UPX-packed binary is invoked, the stub in UPX1 ex-
ecutes and reconstructs the original binary by rebuilding the im-
ports table using the imports in UPX2 and uncompressing the code
in UPX1 into UPX0 ( Sikorski & Honig, 2012 ). UPX uses the UCL
compressor ( Oberhumer et al., 2004 ). This compressor produces
outputs with higher entropy, and consequently a n-gram distribu-
tion closer to uniformity than its input. 
The adaptation of UPX to create EEE requires the manipulation
of both the packing and unpacking processes in a synchronized
way. The manipulation of the packing process is performed after
the compression step when new space is available ( Section 5.1 ). At
this point, EEE reads the parameters for the CERs and creates new
regions with different entropy densities. The positions of these re-
gions in the binary depend on a Gaussian probability distribution
( Fig. 3 ). The delimiters are set at the beginning and end of the
regions. The manipulation of the unpacking process employs the
stub, i.e. the assembly code injected into the packed ﬁle that will
undo the packing process at runtime. Inside the stub, we include a
step that identiﬁes and eliminates the CERs before decompression.
The identiﬁcation process uses the inserted delimiters to ﬁnd the
CERs. Following these steps, we create executable static variants
that in execution run just as their original programs. 
6. Evaluating EEE 
We built EEE to learn the limits of EnTS. Here, we conduct ex-
periments using EEE to ﬁnd these limits. We establish baselines by
evaluating EEE againts SEnt and frequency-based techniques ex-
tracted from the literature. Unfortunately, we ﬁnd that EEE com-
prenhensively defeats all the frequency-based techniques, includ-
ing EnTS. We discuss the prospects for EnTS in Section 6.4 . For
EEE study, we use executable malware. Due to Kaggle malware
has no PE headers, the binaries can not run. Therefore for EEE ex-
periments we used directly the VirusShare dataset for training the
detection algorithms ( Section 3 ). The variants generated by EEE
require a base binary, hence we sample the malware from this
dataset to choose it, in order to ensure that it is known malware
for the detectors. .1. Algorithms and parameters for EEE study 
We have focused this part of the study on machine learning
ools. In Table 9 the different techniques are listed. For each tech-
ique we also list the feature space (n-gram vectors or entropy)
nd the machine learning technique that is used during the clas-
iﬁcation phase. Kolter techniques ( Kolter & Maloof, 2006 ) use the
ame feature space (4-grams) and authors report 3 classiﬁers that
enerates top results: Boosting combined with J48 trees, Support
ector machines and boosting combined with Support Vector Ma-
hines. In the case of McBoost ( Perdisci, Lanzi, & Lee, 2008 ) the
uthors use dynamic analysis to generate an unpack version of the
alware, however, this work is not focused on dynamic analysis,
herefore we take the two classiﬁers used for the authors to decide
f a binary is malware or not (authors named these classiﬁer as C1
nd C2). Structural entropy and EnTS are combined with Random
orest, as described in Section 4.1 . 
For the algorithms we have set the speciﬁc parameters speci-
ed in each paper, for those parameters that are not speciﬁed, we
eft the default parameters of the implementation. For training, we
ave used 2 3 of the whole data and we leave 
1 
3 of fresh data for
esting. 
The parameters for EEE are the following: the genetic algo-
ithm has a population containing 50 individuals and evolves dur-
ng 20 generations. In each generation the chromosomes are cho-
en for reproduction using a tournament process, while 10 individ-
als are chosen to pass directly to the next generation by elitism.
hose that are chosen for reproduction used a two-point crossover
perator whit a probability of 0.8 and the elements mutate with
 probability of 0.1. When no changes are produced in the ﬁtness
alue after 5 generations, the algorithm considers it as a conver-
ence point and stops. For those parameters of UPX that are not
ontrolled by the GA, we have set the default parameters. The
earch is also bounded for those parameters that have no maxi-
um limit: the delimiter length is ﬁxed to 8 bytes, the number of
ER types is 10 and for each type the number of CERs goes from 0
o 20. 
EEE focuses on entropy-based detectors, but it is more sensi-
ive to some detectors than others, therefore Section 6.2 studies its
ffectiveness against different statistical detection techniques. Af-
er, we aim to understand its learning abilities. This is studied in
ection 6.3 . 
We have trained the 7 techniques described in Section 6.1 , and
e measured their test accuracy and FNs, shown in Table 9 . 
.2. EEE effectiveness against frequency-based detection. 
Initially, our interest is to understand how the detectors can
chieve high level of accuracy. Table 9 shows the accuracy for the
lassiﬁers. 
EEE aims to defeat detectors based on entropy features, there-
ore initially, we ask: “How effective is EEE against entropy-based
alware detectors?” For this experiment, we train two detectors
sing our malware corpus: Structural Entropy ( SEnt ) ( Baysa et al.,
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Fig. 5. False negative rate for the malware detectors. The blue bar represents the 
false negative rate on the corpus before applying EEE . The red bar represents the 
false negative rate on the same corpus after applying EEE . (For interpretation of the 
references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version 
of this article.) 
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t013 ) and Entropy Time Series (EnTS). After, we sample 250 packed
alware and 250 non-packed malware from the training corpus
sing an uniform distribution. EEE repacks these instances, origi-
ally classiﬁed as malware, until they are no longer detected, in-
reasing the false negatives rate of the detector. 
Fig. 5 shows how the false negative rate is increased by EEE for
tructural Entropy ( SEnt ) and the Entropy Time Series (EnTS) de-
ection techniques. SEnt is more sensitive than EnTS to EEE grow-
ng from 7.4% false negatives to 95.9%, while EnTS grows from 9.4%
o 90.8%. This supposes an increment of, at least, 80 points show-
ng the effectiveness of EEE against these techniques. 
EEE manipulates the original entropy signature used by both,
nTS and SEnt . It changes its shape to obtain the misclassiﬁcation.
Ent operates with the segmentation generated by the signature,
nd compares two signatures with the Levenshtein distance, i.e. ,
he edition needed from the original signature to obtain the other,
sing the segments’ entropy and size as the edition units. Once
EE manipulates the signature, the edition from the original to the
ariant is higher, this makes the variant more different, guiding to
he misclassiﬁcation of SEnt . EnTS considers the whole signature
s a point in a multi-dimensional space. EEE manipulations trans-
ate the point in several dimensions, changing its possition with
espect to the discrimination boundary. This is enough to deter-
ine that the two signatures are far from each other, and, as a
onsequence, they are considered different. 
Once we have evaluated the effectiveness of EEE against
ntropy-based detection methods, we also want to ask about its
ffectiveness against other frequency-based detection techniques,
herefore, we ask: “How well does EEE work against n-gram vector
ased detection techniques?”
In this case, EEE is not targeting these methods, however, both,
he compression and the injection of controlled entropy regions,
anipulate the n-gram frequency, therefore they affect the detec-
ion. 
For this experiment, we implemented 5 different n-gram vector
ased detection methods extracted from the literature. Their accu-
acy and false negative rates are in Table 9 . In this case we have
hosen three different classiﬁers sharing the same feature space
nd two different feature space sharing the same classiﬁer. Thisecision helps to understand the importance of the feature space
nd the chosen classiﬁer. 
Fig. 5 show the false negative rates for all the techniques. For
he three Kolter’s technique, we can see that, even when the boost-
ng based classiﬁers are more accurate, according to Table 9 , they
re also more sensitive to EEE than SVM. According to the ﬁgure,
oosting J48 and boosting SVM increase their false negative rates
n 98.7 and 89.7, respectively, while SVM only increases its false
egative rate 85.9 points. For McBoost’s techniques, the increment
s stronger in the 2-gram feature space than in the 3-gram feature
pace (95.7 and 87.5 points, respectively). These results show that
oth, the feature space and the classiﬁer are sensitive places for
ttacking using techniques such as EEE , because, for Kolter’s clas-
iﬁers, SVM shows better results than the others using the same
eature space. MCBoost’s detectors show that the 3-gram feature
pace is stronger than the 2-gram feature space, using the same
lassiﬁcation technique. 
These results show that EEE performs modiﬁcations that affect
he n-gram counting process. This changes the distribution, affect-
ng specially the most frequent grams. These changes affect the
lassiﬁers, specially those sensitive to speciﬁc features, such as the
ost frequent one. 
indings. EEE is effective against entropy-based detection, and
urprisingly, it is also effective against n-gram vectors based de-
ection, incrementing the false negative rates, at least, 80 points
ith respect to the original rate. 
.3. EEE learning process 
The previous section measures the abilities of EEE to evade n-
ram vectors and entropy based detection techniques, however, we
re also interested in measuring the effort of EEE to defeat these
echniques. This effort can be measure in terms of the evolutionary
rocess. Therefore we ask: “How many generations does the evolu-
ionary process need to defeat a detection technique?”
For this experiment we use the same setup of the previous sec-
ion, and we increment the granularity to the number of genera-
ions. By design, all the classiﬁers detect malware when its mali-
ious probability is higher than 0.5. Then, considering a population
f EEE parameters, this experiment aims to measure when these
arameters are properly set to generate variants that always evade
he classiﬁer. In terms of search, this is consider as a convergence
oint, therefore we want to ﬁnd the convergence point of the evo-
utionary algorithm. 
Fig. 6 shows the evolution of the median detection probability
f the whole population over a number of generations. The gray
ine in 0.5, represents the boundary between being detected as
alware (over 0.5 probability) and not being detected as malware
under 0.5 probability). The ﬁgure shows that during the ﬁrst gen-
ration at least one technique goes under 0.5 probability (McBoots
etector using 2-grams). In the fourth generation, there is a strong
ecaying tendency for all the techniques. From the seventh genera-
ion, no technique is over the threshold. This shows how the learn-
ng process is reducing the detection abilities of all techniques, but
t also shows that the behaviour of EEE is different for the differ-
nt techniques. 
It is important to remark that some techniques, such as Mc-
oost’s classiﬁers, have a stepped tendency. Analysing the classi-
er feedback during the evolutionary process, we discovered that
t provides discreet values, generating a ﬁxed set of detection lev-
ls. Kolter’s and entropy based detection techniques have a contin-
ous tendency. In this case, the classiﬁer generates continues val-
es. Continuity is better for the search process, due to it is easier
o ﬁnd a gradient by learning. 
258 H.D. Menéndez et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 118 (2019) 246–260 
Fig. 6. Evolution of the median detection probability for the variants created using 
EEE by generation. 
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w  It is also interesting to remark that several techniques have an
asymptotic behaviour close to 0.2. The search process focuses on
defeating the classiﬁer ﬁnding vulnerabilities on it, that is, areas
where our modiﬁcations might generate a misclassiﬁcation, but the
variants used in this experiment come from the original training
data of the classiﬁer. Due to the classiﬁer knows the original mal-
ware, the modiﬁcations are bounded by this knowledge. Trying to
set this value from these variants is an open problem. 
Findings. EEE learns to defeat detectors reaching its convergence
point in less than 8 generations of the search process. The most
resisting technique against EEE is EnTS. 
6.4. Prospects for EnTS 
EEE comprehensively defeats EnTS and the other frequency-
based detectors from the state of the art. The next step in the
arms race is how to improve EnTS to defeat EEE . There are po-
tential improvements in different directions. First, the packing pro-
cess of EEE is not protected against sophisticated unpacking tech-
niques. Using one of these technique will remove the CERs expos-
ing the original malware. Second, EEE constantly attacks the de-
tection technique. Adding an extra protection to the classiﬁer for
detecting small variations on adversarial queries, might give it the
ability of detecting an adversarial attack. However, a smart adver-
sary could include some dummy variants to cheat this adversary
detector. Finally, EnTS can specialize itself in detecting EEE , ﬁnd-
ing speciﬁc features of EEE variants that can detect an attack. 
7. Related work 
This work examines the prospects for frequency-based malware
detection by taking two steps in the malware arms race. First, it
introduces EnTS to advance the state of the art in frequency-based
detection and, then, immediately creates EEE to advance the state
of the art in evasion by defeating EnTS. This section contextualizes
both tools with respect to the literature. First, we discuss malware
detection in general, before turning prior speciﬁcally on frequency-
based detection. We use frequency-based detection to explore the
arms race, so we close with adversarial machine learning. .1. Dynamic and static analysis in the malware arms race 
Somayaji described the cybersecurity arms race as a coevolu-
ion between the black hats and the white hats ( Somayaji, 2004 ).
e explained that this is a competition with both sides learning
rom each other, but he did not model this phenomena or study it.
uerra et al. did study this coevolution in the context of spam e-
ails ( Guerra et al., 2010 ). They studied this from the perspective
f white hats, focusing on a tool for spam ﬁltering and a dataset of
pam across 12 years. This tool, and similar tools, forced spammers
o evolve. At the same time, the ﬁlters also improved their features
o detect new spam. This study provided evidence of the arms race
oevolution, and we based our work in a similar idea, focused on
odern machine learning detectors. 
Our main detection scenery is disk resident malware, prevalent
pecially in Windows machines. Windows malware has become in-
reasingly sophisticated at hiding itself and resisting analysis. The
iterature contains seveal works mainly focused on static, dynamic
r hybrid techniques aiming to detect it. 
Static analysis, whether based on abstractions of Control Flow
raphs and program semantics ( Preda, Christodorescu, Jha, & De-
ray, 2007 ) or on opcode analysis ( Santos et al., 2010 ), or focused
n PE Headers and Static API Calls ( Xu, Sung, Mukkamala, & Liu,
007; Ye, Li, Jiang, & Wang, 2010 ) as features for machine learn-
ng, faces the increasing diﬃculty of initial reverse engineering.
n addition, Moser et al. demonstrated hard limits to the abil-
ty of static anaysis to deal with obfuscation ( Moser, Kruegel, &
irda, 2007 ). Dynamic analysis via virtual machines and sandboxes
an avoid anti-disassembly measures but suffer from resistance via
ynamic defence predicates and red pill environment detection
echniques ( Paleari, Martignoni, Roglia, & Bruschi, 2009 ). Windows
alware analysis aiming to integrate dynamic and static analysis,
s Santos, Devesa, Brezo, Nieves, and Bringas (2012) , Islam, Tian,
atten, and Versteeg (2013) and andA. Salim (2015) , to produce
eatures for data mining approaches suffer the same problems. 
Recent approaches to Android malware exploit the relative lack
f sophistication of that type of malware. These include Drebin
 Arp et al., 2014 ), CopperDroid ( Tam, Khan, Fattori, & Cavallaro,
015 ), which combine machine learning with behavioural models.
ther tools as DroidSIFT ( Zhang, Duan, Yin, & Zhao, 2014 ) are fo-
used on anomaly detection and malware family classiﬁcation. 
Malware detection tools focused on network neighbour-
oods, for example, Nazca ( Invernizzi et al., 2014 ) and AESOP
 Tamersoy, Roundy, & Chau, 2014 ) show real promise in terms of
cale and accuracy but require ground truth as a seed, just as
ur similarity techniques do. Also, the work of Zhongqiang Chen
t al. focuses on how malware is propagate on these networks
 Chen et al., 2012 ). Our work focuses on frequency-based detec-
ors, that have the ability of detecting malware before any static or
ynamic analysis. 
.2. Frequency-based detection 
In 1994 Kephart presented an n-gram approach for extracting
ignatures but reported no results ( Kephart, 1994 ). In 2001, Schultz
t al. used several data mining techniques on binaries to distin-
uish between benign and malicious executables in Windows or
S-DOS format. Memory consumption was a scalability bottleneck.
hey experimented on a dataset of 3265 malware and 1001 benign
les but lacked fresh data for testing. Validation achieved 97.11%
ccuracy with 3.8% FP rate ( Schultz, Eskin, Zadok, & Stolfo, 2001 ). 
In 2006, Kolter and Maloof used Information Gain combined
ith byte level analysis of n-grams to classify and detect malware.
gain they did not use fresh data for the test phase. They exper-
mented on two small datasets, one of 476 malware, 561 benign-
are (95% accuracy with 5% FP in validation); the second of 1971
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B  enign-ware, 1651 malware (94% accuracy and 1% FP in validation)
 Kolter & Maloof, 2006 ). 
In 2007, Lyda and Hamrock used the average entropy of a whole
le and the entropy of speciﬁc code sections (discovered only by
sing static analysis). They showed that binary ﬁles with a higher
ntropy score tend to be correlated with the presence of encryp-
ion or compression. They compared more than 20,0 0 0 malware to
heck whether they are able to detect these concealment methods
ut did not consider malware detection ( Lyda & Hamrock, 2007 ).
n the same year, Stolfo et al. used 1-gram and 2-gram byte distri-
utions for a ﬁle to compare it with different ﬁletype models for
letype identiﬁcation ( Li, Wang, Santos, & Herzog, 2005 ) in mal-
are detection within DOC and PDF ﬁles. They reported on exper-
ments with over 140 pdfs and 361 benign and 616 malware and
esults with between 3% to 20% of false positives but no accuracy
nformation. This work considered n-grams in a vector space, us-
ng their frequency and variation as features, but each dimension
as a n-gram resulting in exponential increase in the number of
imensions ( Stolfo, Wang, & Li, 2007 ). 
Tabish et al. in 2009 divided ﬁles into blocks, and calculated
requency of n-gram histograms for each block, then extracted sta-
istical and information-theoretic features from the histogram to
eﬁne a feature vector per block. They used this to classify a fea-
ure vector as normal or potentially malicious. Pairwise compari-
on between blocks of different ﬁles reduces the scalability of this
pproach. They claimed an accuracy rate of 90% with a False Posi-
ive rate of around 10% ( Tabish, Shaﬁq, & Farooq, 2009 ). 
Santos et al. in 2011 introduced a semi-supervised methodology
o reduce the labelling process. Their n-gram vector was the fre-
uency of all possible n-grams, an important scalability limitation.
fter experiments on 10 0 0 malware and benign-ware, they re-
orted 89% of accuracy with 10% of false positives ( Santos, Nieves,
 Bringas, 2011 ). 
Finally, Sorokin presented SEnt in 2011 ( Sorokin, 2011 ). The
rst evaluation of SEnt was an use case comparison between
wo ﬁles. After, Baysa et al. extended it to metamorphic malware
n 2013 ( Baysa et al., 2013 ), showing that this technique scales
uadratically. This was a consequence of the implicit pairwise com-
arison of the metric. Another relevant bottleneck, that the au-
hors identiﬁed in the technique, was the deﬁnition of the seg-
ents that describe the ﬁles. This deﬁnition depends on three pa-
ameters whose setting depends on the analyst. The Levenshtein
istance, applied during the ﬁles comparison, depends directly on
he parameters. They directly affect the number of segments that
ill pass to this metric, affecting to the performance. EnTS is free
f this parametrization, leveraging directly the properties of the
avelet to speed up the comparison and scale linearly. 
EnTS has three advantages over previous work in detection via
yte level content: (1) better accuracy combined with lowenr false
ositive rates, (2) better (linear) scalability in the detection phase,
nd (3) a more rigorous experimental approach. Nevertheless, EnTS
s sensitive to adversarial machine learning, introduced in the next
ection. 
.3. Adversarial machine learning 
Adversarial machine learning inspired our step forward into
he arms race. This ﬁeld aims to exploit the vulnerabilities of
 learning system, attacking the test data distribution and mak-
ng it different to the training data ( Moreno-Torres, Raeder, Alaiz-
odríGuez, Chawla, & Herrera, 2012 ). The adversary introduces
oise into the data or makes some other alteration to achieve a
isclassiﬁcation. This sensitivity was originally noticed on spam
etectors ( Chinavle, Kolari, Oates, & Finin, 2009 ), where the adver-
ary studied different modiﬁcations to emails to enable the passing
f machine learning based ﬁlters. Xu, Qi, and Evans (2016) were the ﬁrst authors applying these
odels to malware. They created evademl, a genetic programming
ool that modiﬁes pdf malware to cheat two machine learning
ased detectors, extracted from the literature: Hidost ( Šrndic &
askov, 2013 ) and PDFrate ( Smutz & Stavrou, 2012 ). In this work,
he authors knew the features used by the machine learning al-
orithm, the classiﬁers, and the training data. In particular, they
ad access to the classiﬁcation probabilities, providing them with
 search gradient per classiﬁer. In addition, they were effectively
orking off-line with no evolution on the part of the detectors. In
ur experiments, EEE did not use any information about the train-
ng data or the detector features it attempted to attack. Moreover,
EE creates variants for Windows binary executable malware that
s protected against disassembly or reassemble, while evademl ma-
ipulates PDF malware. Furthermore, since UPX is compatible with
everal different architectures, EEE can potentially be adapted to
everal different platforms ( Oberhumer et al., 2004 ). More recent
orks, as the one introduced by Calleja, Martín, Menéndez, Tapi-
dor, and Clark (2018) apply adversarial machine learning to cheat
he triage process of malware analysis. 
Adversarial machine learning has been also consolidated as an
nalytical process to measure the degree to which different ma-
hine learning algorithms can be exploited. A good example is the
ork of Biggio et al. who studied different vulnerabilities for Sup-
ort Vector Machines. They also presented a methodology to im-
rove the robustness of this classiﬁcation technique ( Biggio, Nel-
on, & Laskov, 2012 ). They extended this work to another classi-
er, where they also formalized the language for adversarial mod-
ls ( Biggio, Fumera, & Roli, 2014 ). While important, this work is
angential to this paper as we only used access to the classiﬁca-
ion output as a ﬁtness function. 
. Conclusions 
We have demonstrated that EnTS outperform previous informa-
ion theoretic similarity measures. Its level of abstraction makes
t diﬃcult to counter and it offers scalability advantages. We have
emonstrated excellent precision and accuracy on a representative
ixture of malware types drawn from the Kaggle malware data
nd VirusShare. Indeed, EnTS outperforms existing AntiVirus en-
ines (as represented in VirusTotal) for accuracy and precision. Its
ime complexity is bounded above by the number of ﬁles to be
lassiﬁed. As an automated, execution agnostic, string-based simi-
arity metric it offers wider scalability advantages beyond its time
omplexity class alone – reducing human effort and reducing the
eed for dynamic or static analysis. 
EEE also demonstrated its ability to increment false negatives
n entropy and n-gram based detectors. It learns from them, creat-
ng variants whose properties are unknown to the classiﬁer or sim-
lar to benign-ware. It is the ﬁrst packer with the ability to learn
bout its concealment strategy. 
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